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We are bound to labor: either we are either among the many who must labor to live, or among the few who live from the labor of others. We are bound in two senses: labor is something we are “bound to do,” something we are destined to from the start of our lives, and also something we experience as being “bound to,” as a bind or tie. Our destiny is to be tied to labor. This is no less the case if, as we experience today, “work itself becomes an object which he [or she] can only obtain through an enormous effort and with spasmodic interruptions” (Marx, 1975, 324). The situation of “precarity” is one that has characterized the capitalist history, except for rare exceptions, and those exceptions, notably the post-war “welfare states” are steadily being returned to the “historical norm”. In facing this situation, intensified by capitalist crisis, we confront the problem of labor as one of its presence and its absence.
	While struggles around this question are intermittent and often cryptic, a wave of theoretical reflection has been committed to detaching life from labor. These are what I have called, after Foucault, the “savage ontologies of life” (Noys, 2015). It was Foucault, in The Order of Things [1966], who identified this “savage ontology” as one in excess of the determinations of political economy (Foucault, 1970, 279). It was also Foucault who, infamously, dismissed Marxism as bound to the nineteenth century “like a fish in water” (1970, 262). Marx occupies an equivocal position in this configuration. Marx’s work presents an analysis of the inextricable binding of our lives to labor under capitalism, while also promising an exit from this situation. The tension comes in this exit, which seems to equivocate between freeing us from capitalist labor into new forms of labor and freeing us from the very category of labor.
	The identification of Marx with labor is often used to delimit the worth of Marx’s analysis, to suggest he concedes too much to labor, and hence too much to capitalism. Hannah Arendt noted how Marx not only articulated life in terms of labor, but also prefigured the “greatest representatives of modern life philosophy,” due to his “equat[ing] Life and Being” (1959, 375). In recent theoretical work the desire has been to cut the bind of life and labor, to free life from labor, and to return to an excess of life beyond metaphysical and capitalist determination. Here I want to suggest it is not so simple to cut the Gordian knot. Instead, it is only by exploring our binding to labor that we can grasp the possibilities of transcending capitalist labor. To conduct this analysis I want to return to the early Marx in unusual company: Jacques Derrida. Even more unusually I do not want to turn to Derrida’s Specters of Marx [1993], but to one Derrida’s early essays, which contains one of his few mentions of Marx. Reading the early Marx with the early Derrida, I suggest, opens a study of the binding of life to labor that opens a field of “restricted action,” to use Mallarmé’s phrase, but one that opens some room for maneuver.

Archi-alienation
In his essay on Antonin Artaud “La parole soufflée” [1965] (1978, 169–95), Derrida draws a parallel between Artaud and the early Marx in a long footnote, which I quote in full, excepting a quote from Marx:
Each time that it operates within the framework that we are attempting to restore here, Artaud’s language has a precise resemblance, in its syntax and vocabulary, to that of the young Marx. In the first of the Manuscripts of 1844, the labor which produces the work and gives it value (Verwertung) proportionately increases the de-preciation (Entwertung) of its author … [Marx quote] … This juxtaposition escapes the realms of intellectual puttering or of historical curiosity. Its necessity will appear later when the question of what belongs to that which we call the metaphysics of the proper (or of alienation) is posed. (Derrida, 1978, 325 n.20)
Derrida’s contention is that this this “precise resemblance” of language between Artaud and the “young Marx” is not only limited to the issue of how the increase of labor involves the “decrease” or “diminishment” of the worker. Derrida also suggests that this “juxtaposition,” this bind, is not a matter of chance, but of necessity concerning “the metaphysics of the proper” and alienation.
	I want to use this footnote to license a reading of Marx with Derrida. First this involves reconstructing Derrida’s reading of Artaud. Derrida explores Artaud’s texts as divided, between, on the one hand, the desire to establish a writing or work “without difference” (175), a “metaphysics of life” (179), “the dream of a life without difference” (180). On the other hand, Artaud’s insistence on an originary theft or alienation of every form of writing, or every voice, supposes the ruination of every form of property or propriety, the impossibility of a moment of presence “prior to all dissolution” (183). Derrida, ventriloquizing Artaud in a later text, states: “I have been robbed, not of this or that, but myself robbed of myself, in the very stuff of myself” (1998, 93). This originary alienation results in what Derrida calls a “scato-logy” (182), a separation in which the work is excrement and the propriety of property “soiled” by the improper. This double movement is evident in Artaud’s disarticulation of the “proper” body: the body is subject to an original disarticulation in which the organs are the “enemies” of the body, but it is possible to “recover” a body “without differences,” a “real” body “without organs” (186).
	Artaud’s “dream of a life without difference,” a presence of life without binding, prefigures the savage ontologies of life, as a largely unacknowledged precursor. This reading of Artaud would remain faithful to the Artaud who wanted to cut the tie to Marx – “the revolution invented by Marx is a caricature of Life” and to Marxism – “Have come to Mexico / to flee the Barbarity of Europe / last example of European Barbarity: Marxism” (Artaud in Esslin, 108–9, 109). Derrida’s stricture on this reading is to indicate the instability of this form of unbinding. The originary unbinding of alienation, which casts us out into language, into property, and into difference, also places us in a bind. It is the extremity with which Artaud inhabits the binding to metaphysics, to the effect of alienation as originary, which threatens to ruin the metaphysics of subjectivity, of (re)appropriation, and of property. The “escape” is not into an exteriority of life, or not only this, but through an interior rupture.
	It is not difficult to see in this reading of Artaud some of the lineaments of Derrida’s later reading of Marx in Specters of Marx. To again summarize briefly and brutally, Marx will intuit and enact the structure of spectrality, of hauntology, which dislocates metaphysics, by hinting towards the “primacy” or better irreducibility of “spectrality.” While, at the same time, Marx will also always desire to exorcise this spectrality, to establish or re-establish a “presence,” a transparency, an ontology or metaphysics of presence that can bring an end to the “madly spectral” dance of ghosts (Derrida, 1994, 57, emphasis in original, 161). Derrida’s later reading is certainly divided, suggesting the multiplicity of Marx, but still, I wager, appears less sympathetic than that given to Artaud. Instead, I want to take something of the more generous reading of Artaud and place this generosity within the reading of the early Marx. Whereas Artaud transforms the tension of life and labor into a world-historical drama of life trying to detach itself from labor, a hyperbolic or exorbitant speculation on life “without difference” that reveals and ruins this dream that lies within metaphysics, I want to suggest Marx’s attention to the binding of life and labor insists this bind cannot be simply cut. Marx, on this reading, leaves us within a stricture, within the bind of the economic, but this is a way to open another reading, another possibility.

The Double-Bind of Labor
Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 are texts with a checkered history, which we inherit now as the works of “humanism” and “alienation.” Once functioning as banners raised against the sclerosis of “official communism,” these texts have since “dated.” Subject to the critique of Althusser (1969) for their “theoretical humanism,” these texts also fall foul of the general suspicion of “humanism” and “alienation,” not to say “essence,” that resulted from “theory.” Even in the present return to Marx we can note the dominance of Capital and the attention to the analysis of value, which is but one result of the global financial crisis. After Derrida’s reading of Artaud, I want to argue there is something worth returning to in these apparently more “metaphysical” texts of Marx. Such a return may allow us to shake the assumption that these texts are “saturated” by metaphysics and, in particular, the “metaphysics of labor.”
	In his discussion of “estranged (or alienated) labor” Marx begins from interrogating the assumption of political economy that we begin from private property. The result is a disconnection, in which all the elements that constitute political economy – especially labor, capital, and landed property – appear separately. This fragmentation is licensed by the positing of “some imaginary primordial condition” (323); in the language of Derrida the “dream … of full presence, the reassuring foundation” (1978, 292). In the case of political economy, this “imaginary primordial condition” is specified by Marx in the Grundrisse as that the fantasy of the “Robinsonades” of “the individual … detached from … natural bonds” (Marx, 1973, 83), who reflects, in fact, the atomized condition of civil society. Instead of this imaginary beginning, Marx suggests that we must begin from the worker’s position as a commodity, for whom their labor and its products “stand opposed to it as something alien” (324).​[1]​ The paradox, a socially-produced paradox, is of a beginning in division, in alienation, a divided beginning, which while still referring to a “unity” is, as we will see, more complex than an invocation of prior presence.
	Marx argues that for the worker the separation from their own product and subjection to the form of civil society results in a loss of reality, and that: “So much does the realization of labor appear as loss of reality that the worker loses his reality to the point of dying of starvation” (324).​[2]​ The result is that the exertion of the worker increases his alienation, in the point that Derrida explicitly links to Artaud. In this situation life is displaced: “the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and alien” (324). It is also, as it is for Artaud, a corporeal process, the worker “from being a man becomes an abstract activity and a stomach” (285). Not so much a “body without organs,” as a body of work with only one organ.
	This process of alienation begins with nature, with “the sensuous external world” (235), which is the first “object” of appropriation. Again, a displacement operates in which the identity of being a “worker,” which is secondary, comes to overlay and determine the condition of being a “physical subject” (325). This is reminiscent of the Freudian logic of “deferred action,” in which a “later” trauma comes to reactivate the “original trauma,” which only exists through that “later event” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, 111–14). In this case, the trauma and the deprivation of reality found in the identity of “worker” determine and reactivate the need for survival in the “physical subject.” The “originary” dependence on “nature” is overwritten and overdetermined by the “secondary” dependence on capital, which now becomes the “primary” condition of access to subsistence and “natural” substance. Political economy cuts this thread of dependence, concealing the relation between labor and production, by supposing the “free” choice of alienation and exchange.
	There is no choice to labor, no choice over the binding dependence on producing to sustain life, which is also the separation from the means of subsistence that Marx will analyze under the form of “originary accumulation” in Capital (1990, 873–942). So, labor is forced labor. This is the double-bind of capital: without the means of subsistence we are forced to labor, but labor cannot satisfy us, it is always depriving us of our substance and reducing us to mere survival. In Marx’s formulation, under capitalism we find: “the abstract existence of man as a mere workman who therefore tumbles day after day from his fulfilled nothingness into absolute nothingness” (336). The worker “tumbles” from the “fulfilled nothingness” of labor into the “absolute nothingness” of the time not devoted to “wage-earning activity” (289), or to the time of unemployment.
	This alienation from the self also afflicts our relations with others: we are all alienated from our human essence and so all alienated from each other. In his contemporaneous notes on Mill, Marx discussed this mutual alienation in terms of language. Our language becomes “the language our possessions use together” (276). This language usurps our usual experience, generating a situation where: “We are so estranged from our human essence that the direct language of man strikes us as an offence against the dignity of man, whereas the estranged language of objective value appears as the justified, self-confident and self-acknowledged dignity of man incarnate” (276-77). This prefigures Marx’s analysis of commodity language in Capital (see Hamacher, 2008), and our language is, again, over-written with a new language that usurps our “true” language.
	Before and beyond the language of the commodity lies an “immediate expression” (277), that would have “directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my human, communal nature” (278). In this situation, in a fascinating metaphor, Marx suggests: “Our productions would be as many mirrors from which our natures would shine forth” (278). There is enough here – in these claims to “immediate expression” and “authentic nature” – to condemn Marx out of hand as belonging to a humanism and a metaphysics of presence in an uncritical fashion. This would be a metaphysics of subjectivity in two senses: an insistence of the metaphysics of subjectivity in the propriety of the individual, prior to all division; and a metaphysics of subjectivity in terms of community and immanence and transparency. We can interpolate Derrida’s later suspicions from Specters of Marx concerning use-value, especially Derrida’s remark that use-value can “always relate to what is proper to man, to the properties of man” (1994, 188). While Derrida admits the critical function of use-value, this validity only operates if use-value does not refer to an original “strict purity” (1994, 160).
	The same stricture would seem to apply to “species-being.” Contrary to appearances, however, I want to suggest that this view of “essence” is not simply exhausted by the metaphysics of presence or purity. If Artaud posited originary alienation as a threat to the propriety and property of the metaphysics of subjectivity, Marx posits an originary exchange that threatens the distinction of use and exchange. Marx specifies that species activity is exchange, “whose real, conscious and authentic existence consists in social activity and social enjoyment” (265). We are predestined to exchange, to engage, to find our “essence” as a primary relationality, which results in the fact that “essence” is community. This primary exchange is the one over-written by capitalist exchange-value, which imposes a relation of value onto this relationality: “economics establishes the estranged form of social commerce as the essential and fundamental form appropriate to the vocation of man” (266). Economics creates a “(second) nature” of competition, immiseration, and wealth, in replacement of the “nature” of humans as creatures of exchange and recognition. This “overlaying” is not some “natural” and destined fall from grace. Capital comes into the world “dripping with blood and dirt” (Marx, 1990, 956); it is an act of historical violence generated, primarily, out of the separation of workers from their means of subsistence and sustained as a social form by constant and ongoing violence.
	One striking confirmation of Marx’s view of the complexity and relationality of “species-being,” can be found in what we can call “Marx’s critique of communism.” This involves a shift from questioning the assumption of a “simple origin” to questioning the notion of ending as “eschatological presence” (Derrida, 1987, 45). The cliché of communism lies in the supposition of communism as a state of transparency, of a conscious control over production. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx critiques communism as a simple reversal of the capitalist relation to private property. The destruction of private property in “crude” communism threatens the fact “the category of worker is not abolished but extended to all men” (346). Pursuing a reductio ad absurdum, Marx argues this “wholly crude and unthinking communism” will replace marriage with “a community of women,” and so lead to “universal prostitution” (346). Instead of replacing private property, this kind of communism is a “logical extension” of private property, expanding it to the community. Prefiguring Nietzsche’s analysis of ressentiment, Marx suggests this “envy” results in an abstract negation, a leveling down, which raises labor to the condition of “an imaginary universality” (347).
	This is only a first form of communism, and the process of “the reintegration or return of man into himself” (347), requires “the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being” (348). Certainly, this is no less “metaphysical,” if we wish, but this form of resolution, this form of communism, develops from the complexity of the present and does not seek its proof “in isolated historical forms” (348). The basis for revolution, for Marx, has to be found “in the movement of private property” (348), which can then be returned into “real life” (349). Rather than unbinding, it is only through a “bond,” through the linking with others, through the relation of sociality, that communism can take place. This is not to erect the social over humans, which for Marx is another abstraction (350), hence the stress on the individual and the realization through “property” of the community. Marx’s analysis implies a deepening of the complexity of relation as crucial to liberation from capitalism. This suggests that the way out of the bind to capital is through another bind, another linking that will allow us to develop our freedom through our binding to others.

The Autoteleology of Labor
The problem of labor is not one that can be simply dissolved. To deconstruct labor is not to homogenize labor as something to be simply identified with capital and so to be disposed of just like that. This is due to the fact, as Marx brings to our attention, that it is capital that treats labor as abstract, homogenous and interchangeable (Marx 1973, 103–5). In another example of retroaction it is this capitalist homogenization of labor that reveals labor as a “universal,” but at the same time suggests the need to differentiate, extract and complicate labor. Marx’s arguments concerning relationality and property suggest exactly this: communism is not simplification, but complication, not impoverishment, but enrichment.
	It is Werner Hamacher, in an exemplary deconstructive analysis sensitive to Marx, who has drawn attention to the problem of labor. Hamacher notes that Marx is pledged to the abolition of labor, while suggesting “not so much the liberation from labor as the liberation to it” (2008, 179; emphasis in original). But this is to a different form of labor, to labor as an end in itself. Yet Hamacher still, rightly, worries at this. This realization of man in labor, this “substantial labor-language,” remains “the promise of capital” (Hamacher, 2008, 179). Marx can only prolong the dream of capital, he cannot truly interrupt it. This is because Marx’s critique comes to rest on the “sacrament of labor” (Hamacher, 2008, 179). On the other hand, there is in Marx something else, another promise: “a severing of labor from production” (Hamacher, 2008, 179), “an internal disjunction of labor and its autoteleology” (Hamacher, 2008, 180).
	A difficulty lies in distinguishing these two “voices,” between the liberation to labor and the liberation from labor. The notion of labor as a realized end in itself is Marx’s own attempted interruption of the teleology of capitalist labor. The teleology of capitalist labor only ever leads elsewhere – from the labor of the worker to the value extracted by the capitalist. Marx’s suggestion is that binding our labor to ourselves becomes the means to resist this unbinding. What Marx is suggesting is another affirmation of labor, and affirmation of labor otherwise, which does not deny the necessity of “labor” in all its forms, including in all those forms which do not “count” for capital, or at least not directly, especially labor that has largely fallen on women. Instead, Marx tries to engage with labor differently, to imagine or better create another society, another series of relations, in which labor would not be bound to exploitation.
	How do we interrupt labor? Derrida recalls that work (travail) has always been associated simultaneously with dignity, freedom, the good and with evil, suffering, and pain (2002, 224). What we could call the critiques of labor, even the deconstructions of labor, try to tease out and divide these possibilities. Certainly the binary division of “good” non-capitalist labor from “bad” capitalist labor would seem to draw what Derrida calls, in a different context, a “dividing line as real limit and conceptual distinction” (1994, 39). Hence such divisions are eminently deconstructible. The point, however, could also be made to Hamacher’s more careful distinction between labor as “substance” and the “interruption” of labor. Instead, as I would read Hamacher, we need some form of differentiation to remain critical and also a differentiation that could open the problem of work to its “outside”: from “nonproductive” labor, to “self-reproduction,” to all the forms of “invisible labor” (Derrida 2002, 216), as well as all that which resists labor, including what is internal to labor.
	These “political” points may seem to have departed from metaphysical and philosophical questions and problems. Yet, to acknowledge another debt we owe primarily to Marx, sustaining distinctions from the political and the philosophical is a more difficult task that we may imagine. In the case of life and labor their binding is not cut easily but poses what I called a field of “restricted action.” Certainly, this “restriction” appears all the more painful in a situation in which the collective articulations that try to pose this question against capitalism appear fragmented and defensive. While Derrida could argue the death of a certain Marxism might open a space for the imagination of a “New International” (1994, 84–86), we find that “International” in an even more intermittent form than Derrida suggested. In the absence of mass struggles against capitalist labor we find ourselves in a field of “restricted action” (Badiou, 2005, 31). Yet this field also poses us a confrontation with the problem of labor that does not lapse into simplified solutions that hymn the powers of life somehow detached from relation and experience. It is only in the bind to labor that we can start to decrypt our possibilities of collective liberation.
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^1	 I would like to thank Alberto Toscano and Jason E. Smith for their comments on this paper. In all the quotes that follow from Marx the emphases are in the original text.
^2	  I leave the gendered language of these texts as they stand, although not without raising questions about the gendering of labor.
